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ABSTRACT 
 
Hyungshin Park: Finding ZERO: When No New is Bad News 
(Under the direction of Jeffery Abarbanell) 
 
The greater frequency of positive relative to negative earnings surprise in the 
distribution of analysts’ forecast-based earnings surprises is well known. If the market 
anticipates the propensity of managers to generate positive surprises by biasing earnings 
or forecasts, then some of the common assumptions made in the information content 
studies are violated. In this paper I provide a rational framework that predicts and 
empirical tests that document that zero earnings surprises produce significantly negative 
stock price reactions, on average, and increasingly negative a firm’s ex ante probability 
of generating a positive earnings surprise. If the greater frequency of positive than 
negative earnings surprises in typical earnings surprise distributions is attributable to bias, 
then a rational market framework also predicts that the slope coefficient and the y-
intercept in abnormal return-earnings surprise regressions will be negatively correlated; a 
result that I also confirm in my empirical tests. These results have important implications 
for studies that examine the stock price effect of earnings surprises that meet or fail to 
meet hypothesized “bright lines” when empirical tests involve comparing CARs or ERCs 
for observations to the left and right of the bright line. Specifically, if such tests do not 
take into account the ex ante probability of positive earnings surprise inferences can be 
confounded. I review a selection of studies that conclude that there are asymmetric 
market responses around hypothesized bright lines and demonstrate how inferences 
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drawn from announcement abnormal returns and earnings response coefficients can be 
altered by controlling for the propensity for firms to generate positive surprises.  
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1. Introduction 
Evaluating the information content of earnings announcements has been a core 
issue in financial accounting research dating back to Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver 
(1968). A conceptual underpinning of the information content literature is the notion that 
an earnings surprise of exactly zero will generate a neutral (i.e., zero) price response. 
While measures of earnings surprises in the literature have evolved and expanded over 
time, empirical researchers have typically maintained the implicit assumption that the line 
of demarcation between good and bad news (either of which would be expected to 
generate a non-neutral stock price response) is a zero surprise, independently of the actual 
empirical distributions of earnings surprises.  
In this paper I appeal to the results of prior empirical and theoretical studies to 
advance a framework that describes how the market would anticipate the possibility that 
managers systematically bias earnings surprises; a possibility that has been linked to the 
greater frequency of small positive surprises relative to small negative surprises in typical 
distributions of analysts’ forecast errors. I present empirical results that are consistent 
with the predictions of this framework and contradict the traditional “neutral reaction” 
assumption. I also demonstrate the relevance of these findings by showing how 
accounting for the propensity of firms to report positive earnings surprises alters 
inferences of asymmetric price responses around hypothesized bright lines drawn from 
results of empirical tests that rely on the neutral reaction assumption and partition 
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surprises on their ex post sign and magnitude (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002 and Keung, 
Lin and Shih 2009).  
Figure 1 presents empirical evidence that motivates my research questions. It 
depicts the frequency of positive-to-negative surprises, PTN, for non-zero analyst 
forecast-based surprises within an absolute value of 2, 5 and 10 cents, respectively, for 
the years 1993 to 2008. Analyst forecast-based earnings surprises, denoted ES, are 
measured as IBES reported EPS less IBES consensus analyst EPS estimates. It is evident 
in the figure that the frequency of positive surprises is consistently greater than negative 
surprises of a similar magnitude over the sample period. The imbalance is greatest for 
surprises of smaller absolute magnitudes and varies non-monotonically over time.
1
   
Evidence consistent with that depicted in figure 1 has been reported in the literature 
on analyst forecast errors for over a decade (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999, 
Matsumoto 2002, Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b, Dechow, Richardson and Tuna 2003, 
Brown and Caylor 2005, and Keung, Lin and Shih 2009). Many related studies that 
attempt to explain the propensity for positive earnings surprises identify the role of 
strategic earnings management and/or forecast management intended to influence stock 
price.
2
  
Based on these explanations and the empirical evidence, I address the following 
research questions: do prices respond to earnings surprises in a manner consistent with a 
market that anticipates firms’ propensity for generating positive earnings surprises? If so, 
                                                 
1
In this study I focus on the relative frequency of earnings surprise observations that fall in a small interval 
around and including zero because the overwhelming majority of ex post earnings surprises belong to this 
region, and also because most studies that hypothesize asymmetric market reactions to surprises that meet 
or fail to meet certain thresholds focus on surprises in this region. 
2
There is also a large literature that examines the extent to which scaling surprises by stock price is the 
cause of an apparent excess of small positive surprises over small negative surprises (Durtchi and Easton 
2005). The evidence in figure 1 is not affected by price scaling.  
3 
 
what are the implications for empirical tests of asymmetric or discontinuous responses to 
“bright line” earnings surprises that are likely to be affected by this propensity? 
To answer these questions, I provide a parsimonious model to summarize the 
expected impact on the stock price reactions to earnings surprises when market prices 
anticipate the propensity of managers to generate biased earnings surprises. This simple 
model illuminates essential intuitions gleaned from prior theoretical studies that analyze 
the consequence of management misreporting. For example, Fisher and Verrecchia (2000) 
(hereafter FV) demonstrate that the presence of positive bias in earnings will produce a 
negative average price response in a rational market and this negative market response 
increases in the propensity for management to inflate earnings (see FV, corollary 2).
3
 
Furthermore, FV suggest that the magnitude of the average negative response will be 
inversely related to the earnings response coefficient (ERC). This occurs because, when 
reporting bias is present, for a given change in any exogenous parameter, the intercept in 
a regression of returns on earnings surprises adjusts in the opposite direction from the 
direction that parameter change moves the ERC.
4
   
One implication of these findings is that negative price response will be observed in 
the cross-section for exactly zero surprises when the market expects firms, on average, to 
produce positive surprises. If such a propensity is present, then the “neutral reaction” 
assumption implicitly adopted in traditional information content papers is violated. In 
fact, depending on the propensity to bias surprises upward, it is possible for even small 
                                                 
3
A similar response would be predicted in the earlier model offered in Stein (1989). 
4
The earnings response coefficient is endogenously determined in FV. Specifically, it is increasing in the 
cost of biasing earnings, earnings precision, and prior uncertainty about terminal value, and it is decreasing 
in uncertainty about management objectives (see FV, corollary 1).  To simplify the exposition, I assume 
that the ERC is exogenous. The relevant point, however, is that for a given set of specified exogenous 
parameters the endogenously determined intercept adjust in the opposite direction of the endogenously 
determined ERC.  
4 
 
realized positive surprises to produce, on average, negative price responses in the cross-
section. Thus, in a rational market, surprises of equal magnitude but of opposite signs 
would be expected to generate abnormal returns of different absolute magnitude if there 
is an expected difference in their relative frequency. 
Another, more subtle, consequence of the preceding equilibrium is that when 
surprise realizations are grouped by the ex ante probability that a firm reports a positive 
surprise, firms with a higher propensity for positive surprises are expected to have higher 
ERCs and more negative intercepts than those with a lower propensity. This prediction 
can be used to assess the validity of conclusions in prior literature that hypothesize that 
the market either rationally or irrationally rewards (penalizes) earnings surprises that 
exceed (falls short of) a hypothesized bright line when such conclusions are based on 
comparisons of ERCs or average stock returns of surprises on either side of that bright 
line.   
I present empirical results that are consistent with a market that anticipates the 
propensity for managers to generate positive surprises. Specifically, I find a significantly 
negative mean (median) three-day announcement return of -1.07% (-0.75%) to exactly 
zero surprises.
5
 I employ a rolling-window logit model adapted from Barton and Simko 
(2002) and apply out-of-sample coefficients to in-sample variable values to calculate the 
probability of positive surprise ( PPS) and find that the highest quintile of PPS produces a 
significantly negative mean size-adjusted return of -1.87% while the lowest PPS quintile 
                                                 
5
Baber, Chen, and Kang (2006) and Keung, Lin, and Shih (2009) also find a mean negative announcement 
CAR for zero surprises and attribute it to strategic behavior by managers. However, neither study 
hypothesizes or analyzes a role for the propensity for biased surprises in the cross-section nor considers the 
implications of their average findings for standard tests of asymmetric reactions to surprises of a particular 
sign and magnitude.  
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produces an insignificant mean size-adjusted return of 0.07%.
6
 Furthermore, I estimate 
that the actual level of ES that corresponds to a neutral stock price reaction is between +1 
and +2 cents for high PPS quintile firms and close to 0 cents for low quintile firms over 
the sample period. Finally, I also find that ERCs and intercepts in regressions of returns 
on surprises of small magnitude are negatively associated and also demonstrate how they 
move in concert to reflect the functional relation with PPS.     
The preceding results have important implications for conclusions concerning the 
existence and potential causes of apparent asymmetric rewards or penalties to bright line 
earnings surprises drawn in prior studies.
7
 Specifically, my results suggest that the 
combination of accepting the empirical validity of the neutral reaction assumption and/or 
sorting earnings surprises on their realized values will almost certainly produce the 
appearance of asymmetric responses to bright line surprises in standard tests that compare 
abnormal returns or ERCs on either side of hypothesized bright lines. That is, if the 
market behaves as if it anticipates incentive-induced biases in surprise measures 
employed by researchers, then adherence to standard empirical designs will generate 
statistical results that lend credence to hypotheses that are founded on the supposition that 
there are asymmetric rewards or penalties to surprises that fall on either side of an 
arbitrarily chosen bright line.  
I present evidence that variables that have been used to condition earnings surprises 
in tests of bright line theories, such as ex ante price-to-earnings (PE) and market-to-book 
(MB) ratios, are positively correlated with my measure of PPS. I further show how this 
                                                 
6
The cross-sectional relations I document also hold over time. Specifically, I find a negative serial 
correlation between the PPS measure and returns to exactly zero earnings surprises over the sample period. 
7
I emphasize that this study does not speak directly to the internal validity of hypotheses that predict there 
will be a propensity for managers to bias earnings surprises in an effort to move prices.    
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empirical fact confounds the interpretation of evidence from prior studies that test 
hypotheses that predict asymmetric price responses to bright line surprises but do not 
control for the propensity for positive earnings surprises observed in figure 1.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I motivate my 
empirical hypotheses with arguments and evidence from the empirical literature on 
earnings surprises and theoretical results concerning the expected consequences for 
abnormal returns and ERCs of managerial misreporting in a rational market. In section 3, 
I describe the sample selection procedures and data used in the empirical tests. Section 4 
presents the results of empirical tests of the main hypotheses along with robustness tests. 
In section 5, I present evidence of the impact of controlling for the propensity for positive 
surprises on inference drawn from prior studies that conclude there are asymmetric or 
discontinuous responses to hypothesized bright line surprises. Section 6 contains a 
summary and conclusion. 
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2. The model and empirical hypotheses  
In this section I parse the extensive literature on earnings surprises and identify 
broadly representative studies that refer to strategic incentives for management to 
manipulate surprises in order to gain direct or indirect benefits linked to the firm’s stock 
price. I do not perform a complete review of these literatures or attempt to challenge the 
results or conclusions reached in these studies. Rather, the motivation for this exercise is 
to demonstrate that there are ample empirical findings and arguments in the extant 
literature to justify the generic strategic equilibrium that includes reporting biases 
described below.  
 
2.1. The propensity for positive earnings surprises  
Studies that rely on or analyze analyst forecast-based surprises generally assume 
that when earnings are exactly equal to the outstanding forecast there is no earnings news 
in an announcement.  However, there is abundant empirical evidence of peculiarities in 
distributions of surprises and related explanations for their cause that raise question about 
the validity of this assumption. For example, one stream of literature that investigates the 
distributional properties of analyst forecast-based surprises links the greater frequency of 
small positive forecast errors than small negative forecast errors in the cross-section to 
the possibility of earnings inflation (Degeorge et al. 1999, Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002, 
Matsumoto 2002, and Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003a) find 
evidence to support the existence of an earnings-management-induced “middle 
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asymmetry” in the distribution of analyst forecast-based surprises that is both predictable 
and associated with firms’ stock price sensitivity to earnings news. 8  
Another stream of research that examines biases in earnings surprise distributions 
identifies managerial actions that influence analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002, 
Matsumoto 2002, and Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 2004). These studies focus on the 
possibility that analysts are induced (consciously or unconsciously) by managers to bias 
their forecasts relative to the earnings managers intend to report. Regardless of the exact 
nature of the equilibrium hypothesized, the most recent studies in this literature have 
repeatedly pointed to the greater incidence of small positive surprises relative to small 
negative surprises as evidence of induced pessimism in analyst forecasts.
9
   
The studies cited above, and others in the earnings management literature, rely on 
the argument, or at least entertain the possibility, that firms manage earnings or 
manipulate forecasts to secure direct or indirect benefits from a higher stock price. The 
direction of causality in the link between managerial incentives to inflate earnings or 
induce analyst pessimism to produce positive surprises is sometimes difficult to pin down 
in these studies. However, a common thread among them is an appeal to the notion that 
                                                 
8
Theories that point to strategic management behavior as the direct or indirect cause of bias in ex post 
distributions of earnings surprises also assume there are factors that prevent systematic biases from being 
eliminated from surprises over time (see Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003b for a discussion of why analysts 
would not adjust their forecasts to anticipated biased earnings). I do not attempt to explain how such 
equilibria can arise.  Rather, I proceed from the perspective that such factors can be present (as the 
evidence in figure 1 seems to strongly suggest) in a rational market, and assess whether stock price 
responses behave in a manner that is consistent with a market that anticipates them on average.     
9
Earlier studies by Francis and Philbrick (1993) and Lim (2001) posit that analysts bias their forecasts 
upward to curry favor with managers in return for better access to information and, on average, more 
accurate forecasts.  These studies were highly influenced by prior evidence of persistent mean optimism 
(i.e., negative apparent bias) in analysts’ forecasts in developing and testing the curry favor hypothesis. 
However, as demonstrated in Degeorge et al. (1999), mean optimism in analysts’ forecast errors is 
attributable to the disproportional impact of a relatively small number of extreme observations in the 
negative tail of earnings surprise distributions. It should be noted that Francis and Philbrick (1993) report 
positive median forecast errors in their sample, which is inconsistent with the “curry favor” hypothesis and  
consistent with subsequent studies that hypothesize induced pessimism in analysts’ forecasts. 
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firms that beat hypothesized benchmarks earn equity rewards (Barth, Elliot and Finn 
1999, Bartov et al. 2002, Kasznick and McNichols 2002, Lopez and Rees 2002). 
Presumably, managers’ decisions to manipulate surprises would be linked to managers’ 
perceptions of their ability to move stock prices using earnings news (i.e., stock price 
sensitivity to earnings news).  
Other studies link managers’ incentive to produce positive surprises to efforts to 
exploit private information over limited timeframes (Bartov and Mohanram 2004 and 
Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 2004). Bartov and Mohanram, for example, posit that 
managers produce positive surprises relative to analysts’ forecasts to maintain high stock 
prices during a period in which they exercise stock options and sell shares. Subsequently, 
their firms report the disappointing earnings news that had been withheld by managers. 
Once again, the incentive to engage in such behavior is presumably tied to managers’ 
perception of the stock price sensitivity to earnings news. In sum, the general tenor of the 
representative selection of studies cited above is that bias is more beneficial to managers 
and more likely to occur when stock price is highly sensitive to earnings news. My 
formulation below reflects this assumption.
10
 
    
                                                 
10
The model results in FV are also consistent with this assumption. See equation 22 of FV. 
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2.2. A model of rational responses to biased earnings surprises 
Let       i  = the true earnings of firm i  
is  = the surprise relative to the market’s prior expectation of earnings of firm i 
iiii ssEr  0][   = the reported earnings of firm i 
]|[ iii rEV    = the market value of firm i given ri 
  = positive earnings multiple exogenously given 
 
A firm manager privately observes true earnings, i , where i  is drawn from a 
uniformly distributed discrete random variable 
~
  with mean 0  and support ),(  . 
The manager can disclose iir   or sr ii  , where s  is a positive constant.
11
 Figure 
2 depicts the possible reporting choices of firms at each level of true earnings. In order to 
disclose sr ii  , the firm manager must incur a personal cost of 
2sci , which could 
reflect psychic costs, or the costs of lost reputation or legal liability in the (uncertain) 
event that misreporting is subsequently discovered and penalized. The random cost of 
unit inflation )( ic  is privately known by the manager at the time of the report and is 
                                                 
11
While the analysis I present explicitly contemplates surprises that result from the inflation of true earnings 
relative to an outstanding forecast, an equivalent formulation in which firms report true earnings that are 
above an outstanding forecast that has been manipulated downward at a cost to the manager will produce 
the same results. The relevant forecast could, for example, be issued by an analyst or even by the manager. 
This alternative formulation also assumes a stock price-related benefit that accrues to managers who 
produce a positive surprise that exceeds the stock price and non-stock price-related costs incurred when 
they manipulate forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002) In such equilibria, the more apt characterization of investors’ 
response to an earnings surprise is disappointment when the “true” earnings reported by the firm do not 
exceed a relevant outstanding forecast by an amount that compensates for the expected downward bias in 
forecasts induced by managerial actions. 
11 
 
drawn from the uniform distribution ],[ baU .
 
I impose a regularity condition b
s
a 

 to 
avoid corner solutions.  
When the manager discloses ir  investors make an inference about the manager’s 
reporting choice. The investor’s valuation of a firm is:  
 
]|[)( 00 iiiii srEsrV       (1) 
 
where the earnings multiple,  , is an exogenously given positive number.12 
The manager’s utility function is a linear sum of firm value and the personal cost of 
earnings management. In particular, his utility function is: 
 
)( 0 ii srV     if )( 0  iis   (2) 
2
0 )( scsrV iii    if ss ii  )( 0   (3) 
 
Suppose investors believe that the manager’s reporting choice depends on the 
manager’s observation of i ic c , and that there exists a threshold, ˆ , above which the 
manager reports iir   and below which he reports sr ii  .
13
 Let )ˆ(ˆ  icprobp  , 
then the equilibrium value of the threshold is: 
  
                                                 
12A reasonable objection to this formulation is that it does not account for investors’ expectation of bias in 
earnings from previous periods.  For example, in a multi-period model with some settling up, investors 
could learn precisely which firms are going to bias surprises and unravel it completely and managers would 
have no obvious reason for manipulating surprises. It should be clear, however, that the empirical 
predictions from my model are founded on the assumption that some residual investor uncertainty (or 
incomplete learning) is present in any given period, which includes the possibility that investors 
imperfectly observe the manager’s objective function (see FV for a similar construction). Therefore, for the 
sake of simplicity, I do not explicitly model the impact of previous expected bias in earnings surprises.     
13
 The ^ notation of a variable indicates that it is a conjecture. 
12 
 
s

 ˆ       (4)    
Proof: (see appendix 1)      
   
To summarize, managers have private information regarding true earnings and also 
the manager-specific cost of biasing surprises upward through earnings and/or forecast 
manipulation. Managers must assess the trade-off between the stock price benefit of 
managing surprises and the personal cost of doing so. Investors have imperfect 
information about this tradeoff for individual firms and use it to establish stock price. As 
a result, there exists an equilibrium threshold for the cost of biasing surprises, under 
which firms inflate the surprise and above which they do not. A key feature of this 
equilibrium is that the investors cannot discern whether a specific firm has actually 
biased the surprise by observing it ex post, however, they are aware of the possibility that 
individual firms will do so and adjust the price associated with actual surprises for the ex 
ante probability that bias is present.  
 
2.3. Empirical hypotheses 
In the preceding equilibrium investors form an expectation of the probability the 
manager will strategically bias the earnings surprise and discount that surprise by the 
amount of the expected bias. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The average stock return to a zero surprise is negative and 
increasingly negative in the probability a firm will report a positive surprise 
 
Hypothesis 1a, which follows from the second and the third comparative statics in 
appendix 1, indicates that we should expect the return generated by negative, zero, and 
13 
 
possibly small positive forecast errors all to be negative, and more negative as the ex ante 
probability of positive surprise management increases. This is because, in equilibrium, 
rational investors anticipate that firms with a non-zero probability of generating a positive 
surprise will manage the surprise to a positive number (even if the firm does not actually 
do so because the privately observed cost of biasing surprises is too high), therefore zero 
or even small positive forecast errors will constitute a disappointment to the investors. In 
addition, investors anticipate firms with a greater ex ante probability of surprise 
management will produce an even greater earnings surprise, and, therefore, a zero 
surprise for these firms would be an even greater disappointment to the investors. That is, 
if the model is descriptively valid it should also be the case that: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The level of earnings surprise that corresponds to a neutral stock 
price reaction is a small positive number and increases in the probability that a firm 
reports a positive surprise 
 
Hypothesis 1b, which follows from the fourth and fifth comparative statics in 
appendix 1, implies that the measurement error inherent in assuming that the line of 
demarcation between a good news and bad news surprise is zero increases in the 
probability that a firm manages its earnings surprise. Alternatively, the level of surprise 
that actually corresponds to “no news” becomes more positive as the probability of a 
positive surprise increases. Figure 3 presents a graphical summary of the hypotheses. 
The following hypothesis is relevant to the interpretation of regression-based tests 
of price responses to earnings surprises: 
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Hypothesis 2: In a regression of returns on earnings surprises the earnings response 
coefficient and the intercept are negatively correlated
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2, which follows from the third comparative static in appendix 1, 
predicts a negative correlation between a stock’s earnings response coefficient, β, i.e., the 
slope in the regression of returns on surprises, and the average stock return, α, i.e., the y-
intercept in the regression. This follows because investors are aware of the fact that firms 
with higher ERCs are more likely to generate a positive earnings surprise due to greater 
(more severe) stock price benefit (penalty) to reporting higher (lower) earnings and will 
establish a discount for the expected surprise even before the actual earnings are known 
to or reported by the manager. The higher is the ERC, the greater is that expected 
discount.  
The results of the model I present in this section suggest that if empirical tests of 
theories that predict strategic biases in surprises do not address the expected propensity 
for biased surprises, the conclusion of asymmetric responses to bright line surprises will 
likely be a self-fulfilling prophecy when a rational market anticipates bias in distribution 
of earnings surprises. In addition, some studies implicitly assume or explicitly 
hypothesize an inefficient (correction of a previously inefficient) market response (price 
level) to surprises that meet or fail to meet a particular bright line. Either type of 
argument leads to an expectation of an asymmetric price response to surprises on either 
side of the relevant threshold. While such theories may in fact be descriptive of the world, 
the preceding hypotheses have implications for tests of these theories that rely on 
comparing abnormal returns or ERCs but do not take into account the propensity for 
positive surprises depicted in figure 1. 
15 
 
 
3. Data and preliminary findings  
3.1. Sample Selection 
My sample includes all available quarterly earnings announcements between 1993 
and 2008. I test my main hypotheses using earnings surprises based on analysts’ forecasts. 
I choose 1993 as the beginning of my sample period for two reasons. First, this cutoff 
ensures the congruence of IBES and COMPUSTAT announcement dates. Dellavigna and 
Pollet (2009) report that the IBES announcement date and the COMPUSTAT 
announcement date generally agree after 1988, whereas before 1989 there are many cases 
where these two dates do not agree. Second, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007) document a 
regime shift in the IBES database around 1991-1992, which affects the distributional 
properties of analysts’ forecast-based earnings surprises, and suggest that longitudinal 
studies that straddle the year 1991-1992 but do not account for this shift may generate 
erroneous inferences. 
Analyst forecast-based earnings surprises, ES, are calculated as IBES reported EPS 
less the consensus analyst forecast of EPS. For each earnings announcement I collect EPS 
and the most recent consensus analyst EPS forecast prior to the announcement from the 
stock-split unadjusted IBES dataset.
14
 I restrict the period between the consensus forecast 
and the announcement date to be less than or equal to 31 days in order to eliminate stale 
forecasts. The resulting number of ES observations is 237,535. 
                                                 
14
I use the median analysts’ forecast as the consensus EPS forecast, but the results are qualitatively similar 
when I use the mean analyst consensus forecast. I use stock-split unadjusted, instead of adjusted, IBES 
dataset because evidence in Baber and Kang (2002) and Payne and Thomas (2003) suggests that using 
stock-split adjusted EPS or forecast could lead to a misclassification of non-zero forecast errors as zero 
forecast errors due to retroactive division adjustment to both the EPS and the forecast.  
16 
 
I use CRSP to calculate three-day buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock returns (-1, 1) 
around the announcement in order to assess the market’s reaction to the earnings 
surprise.
15
 Size-adjusted returns are the excess stock returns over the corresponding size-
deciles portfolio returns. Size-deciles portfolio returns are calculated by ranking firms 
into deciles by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
A key variable in my study is the probability of a positive surprise, PPS. I construct 
this variable from a logit regression adapted from Barton and Simko (2002). In order to 
obtain an up-to-date estimate of PPS prior to each announcement, I estimate logit 
regressions in twelve-quarter rolling-windows following the methodology in Cheng 
(2006) as opposed to the pooled regressions employed in Barton and Simko. In addition, 
if any variables that are originally defined in Barton and Simko are not available to the 
market at the time of earnings announcement, they are replaced by the most recent values 
that were available. For example, I replace the current market-to-book ratio, MB, in 
Barton and Simko with the last quarter’s MB. Because of the twelve-quarter rolling 
window estimation procedure, the earliest time period that PPS becomes available is the 
first quarter of 1996. The estimation procedures and descriptive statistics for the variables 
used to construct PPS are presented in appendix 2. 
The total number of quarterly earnings announcements with non-missing EPS, 
consensus analyst forecasts, and the variables required for the PPS calculation is 95,613. 
However, the requirement of three years for the PPS estimation period further reduces the 
sample size to 82,992.  
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Alternatively, I calculate abnormal returns using three different metrics: market-adjusted, market-model 
adjusted and Fama-French three-factor model adjusted returns. My results are qualitatively similar for all 
abnormal return measures, so I only present results for size-adjusted returns for the sake of brevity.  
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3.2. Descriptive statistics and preliminary findings 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in panel A of table 1. All 
variables except for PPS are winsorized at 1% and 99% to reduce the effects of ouliers. 
The skewness measure and comparisons of the 95
th
 to the 5
th
 percentiles of ES 
distribution indicate a longer negative tail, consistent with prior evidence reported in 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b).  The mean ES is small but significantly negative in my 
sample, while the median is slightly positive and significant. Early studies of analyst 
forecast errors typically reported a large negative mean error. However, this finding is 
consistent with conclusions of declining apparent mean optimism in errors reported in 
more recent studies and evidence of change in IBES procedures as to which items to 
include in forecasts and reported earnings after 1991 (Brown and Caylor 2005 and 
Abarbanell and Lehavy 2007) The fact that the surprises are not scaled by price, as is 
frequently the case in prior studies, also contributes to this finding.       
Summary statistics for the PPS measures indicate negative skewness in the 
distribution, but confirm a higher expected incidence of positive surprises in the sample. 
These results are consistent with the distributional evidence of the relatively greater 
frequency of positive than negative surprises in the cross-section and over time in figure 
1, and provide support for the possibility that investors have the ability to predict the 
propensity for small positive surprises commonly found in empirical distributions of ex 
post surprises.   
Summary statistics for MB ratios are on par with those reported by Barton and 
Simko (2002).  In untabulated results I find that the mean and median values of MB and 
PE are higher in my sample than observed for a larger sample that was generated without 
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the requirement of analysts’ forecasts. The CAR measure produces descriptive statistics 
that are consistent with other estimates of size-adjusted returns in the literature. The 
distribution of announcement CARs appears to be nearly symmetric and centered very 
close to zero. 
The correlation matrix in panel B of table 1 indicates a positive association between 
the ES and PPS, consistent with the argument that an ex post surprise is increasing in the 
ex ante estimate of the probability of a positive surprise. Another interesting preliminary 
finding in panel B is the significant positive association between PPS and both the PE 
and MB ratio. This finding continues to hold even when MB is excluded as an 
explanatory variable from the estimation of PPS. The result suggests that the level of 
these ratios may serve as a coarse proxy for the ex ante probability of a positive surprise, 
which, in turn, raises questions about the interpretation of conclusions concerning 
asymmetric price responses around surprise thresholds when data is grouped in the levels 
of these variables. I elaborate on this finding in section 5.      
Panel A of table 2 reports the ratio of positive-to-negative surprises, PTN, for non-
zero surprises of an absolute magnitude of 2, 5 and 10 cents, respectively, by PPS quintile. 
PTN increases monotonically from 1.07 to 5.09 in PPS quintile. Figure 4 summarizes the 
relation between PPS and PTN by high, middle and low quintile over the sample period, 
where the three middle PPS quintiles are assigned to the middle group. PTN is monotonic 
in quintile of PPS in every sample year.  
Panel B of table 2 (top table) shows the number of observations for each level of 
earnings surprise by PPS quintiles. In contrast to some variations of “bright line” theories 
that would predict an increase in frequency for a specific surprise level, e.g., only zero or 
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one cent earnings surprises, the frequency of earnings surprise is clearly increasing in 
PPS for all non-negative earnings surprises, i.e., the distribution shifts to the right 
conditional on PPS. The bottom table of panel B reports the mean values of PPS for 
given earnings surprise levels by PPS quintile. As expected, the mean PPS increases 
across PPS quintile for the same earnings surprise but is stable across earnings surprises 
levels for the same PPS quintile. I will revisit the results of this table in section 5.2.   
Panel C of table 2 reports results related to the time series correlation between PTN 
and PPS by quarter. Model 1 presents the results of a regression of quarterly PTN on 
quarterly PPS.  The coefficient is positive and highly significant.  Model 2 includes the 
time variable. The results indicate a small, but significantly negative time trend in PTN 
for my sample, which is inconsistent with an increasing demand for firms to produce 
positive surprises suggested by Matsumoto (2002) and Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), but 
consistent with a decreasing trend in the incidence of positive surprises documented in 
Koh, Matsumoto and Rajgopal (2008) who argue that firm incentives to produce a 
positive surprise have diminished subsequent to celebrated accounting scandals. Most 
relevant for my study, however, is that the correlation between PTN and PPS over time 
remains positive and highly significant.    
The evidence in table 2 and figure 4 demonstrates that PPS is highly correlated with 
the PTN both in the cross-section and over time. The results provide assurance that an ex 
ante variable has the ability to consistently predict the ex post outcome of interest.  
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4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that the average stock returns to a zero forecast error will be 
negative and become more negative for firms with a greater probability of surprise 
management. Panel A of table 3 reports three-day size-adjusted abnormal returns to zero 
earnings surprises for each year of the sample. Mean and median PPS values exceed 50% 
in every year and mean and median CARs are negative in every year. Negative mean 
(median) CARs are statistically significant in 10 of 13 (9 of 13) years.  The results for the 
entire sample period, which are consistent with average earnings announcement abnormal 
returns results reported in Baber, Chen and Kang (2006), and Keung, Lin and Shih (2009) 
are highly significant. 
The evidence in panel A of table 3 also suggests a relation between the level of PPS 
and the size of the average negative return to a zero surprise. That is, years with higher 
average levels of PPS produce larger negative returns to zero earnings surprises than 
years with relatively lower values of PPS. For example, the mean values of PPS are 
relatively high, ranging from 74.1% to 78.3% in 2002-2006 periods. These years produce 
negative CARs that range from -1.28% to -1.62%. In untabulated results I find that the 
correlation between PPS and CARs for zero surprises is -0.08 (significant at 1% level). It 
is also interesting to note that neither PPS nor CARs for zero surprises are monotonic 
over the years, suggesting that overall incentives to bias surprises and market reactions to 
such biases vary in the cross-section over time.  
Panel B of table 3 presents additional evidence on hypothesis 1a.  The first (second) 
set of rows in the panel report mean (median) CARs for zero surprises by PPS quintile for 
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3 sub-periods (1996-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2008) and for the entire sample period. 
There is a monotonic relation between the level of PPS and CARs. Mean (median) CARs 
range between an insignificant 0.07% (-0.25%) for the 1
st
 quintile of PPS to a significant 
-1.87% (-1.22%) for the 5
th
 quintile for the entire sample period.  A test of differences 
between the 5
th
 and 1
st
 quintile is highly significant. Similar results are observed for all 
sub-periods.  
Hypothesis 1b is the flipside of hypothesis 1a, which is the level of surprise that 
generates a neutral price response is positive and increasing in the probability of a 
positive surprise.  Tests of this hypothesis are intended to provide a numerical feel for the 
amount of surprise in EPS necessary to generate a neutral response, and can be thought of 
as a method of calibrating earnings surprises in tests of price reactions to earnings news; 
i.e., producing an estimate of the earnings surprise that will generate a neutral stock 
response, denoted ZERO.  
Preliminary evidence related to hypothesis 1b is presented in panel A of table 4, 
which reports mean size-adjusted stock returns to small earnings surprises of magnitudes 
ranging from -10 cents to +10 cents after partitioning by quintile of PPS.  Differences in 
returns between the lowest and highest quintile are presented in the last column. The 
mean return to the lowest quintile of PPS significantly exceeds that associated with 
highest quintile for earnings surprises that range from -5 cents up to +2 cents. Differences 
are insignificant for surprises out of this range. This indicates that investors are generally 
more disappointed when high PPS firms just miss, meet or just beat the forecast than 
when low PPS firms generate the identical earnings surprises.     
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Panel B of table 4 presents the results of two methods of estimating the value of 
ZERO: interpolation and regression. The interpolation method connects two adjacent 
surprises around zero; one of which produces a positive mean size-adjusted return and the 
other a negative mean size-adjusted return. The point where the interpolated line crosses 
the surprise axis is the estimated surprise that corresponds to ZERO (see figure 5). The 
regression method entails running a linear regression of CAR on a small range of 
surprises: -2 cents to +2 cents surprise. ZERO, the x-intercept, is calculated using the y-
intercept and the slope from the regression.
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Estimates of ZERO are presented for each year of the sample. ZERO is positive in 
all years and significant in most years after 2000.
17
 This pattern is generally consistent 
with the pattern of mean and median CARs for zero earnings surprise reported in panel A 
of table 3. For the entire sample period, average ZERO is estimated to be 0.54 cents and 
0.49 cents for the two methods, respectively, indicating that earnings surprises must be in 
the neighborhood of positive one half cent to be considered “no news” in the average 
annual cross-section. ZERO estimates from the two alternative methods are generally 
congruent over time.   
Panel C of table 4 presents estimates of ZERO by PPS quintiles for the 3 sub-
periods described earlier and for the entire sample period. Note ZERO for the first PPS 
quintile is insignificant, while for higher PPS quintiles ZERO tends to be significantly 
positive and increasing in quintiles of PPS. For the full sample period, the interpolation 
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ZERO=-1*(y-intercept/slope). Note that given the evidence in figure 1 and the literatures this study 
addresses, I focus my regression tests on the earnings surprise observations near the center of the 
distribution, in this case between -2 and 2 cents.  These observations comprise approximately 50% of the 
observations in the typical quarterly earnings surprise distribution. Results for earnings surprises in ranges 
up to an absolute value of 5 cents produce qualitatively similar results. 
17
The statistical significance of ZERO is assessed through a bootstrapping technique described in table 4.  
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(regression) method yields a ZERO estimate of -0.09 (-0.26) cents for the lowest PPS 
quintile, and +1.18 (+1.20) cents for the highest PPS quintile. The differences are highly 
significant.  These results indicate that firms with a low probability of a positive surprise 
can produce zero or a slightly negative surprise and generate a neutral stock price 
reaction, while firms with a high probability of positive surprise require a surprise of 
between +1 and +2 cents to generate a neutral stock price reaction. While there is some 
variation, estimated values of ZERO for high and low PPS firms can be characterized 
similarly across sub-periods. Overall, the results in table 4 provide support for hypotheses 
1a and 1b as well as some validation of the methods used to estimate the ZERO.   
 
4.2. Hypotheses 2  
In order to test hypothesis 2, I estimate the ERC in each of the 52 quarters that 
comprise my sample from regressions of CARs on ES in the range of -2 to +2 cents.  As 
discussed in footnote 2, prior literature raises concerns about scaling surprises by stock 
price.
18
  Therefore, I run my tests using both unscaled and scaled earnings surprises to 
ensure results are not driven by spurious correlation. Results using scaled earnings 
surprises are essentially the same as using unscaled surprises and thefore not presented.  
Panel A of table 5 presents benchmark regressions of 3-day announcement CARs 
on earnings surprises in the range of -2 to +2 cents (Model 1) in the pooled, yearly and 
quarterly regressions. Model 1 results, which are presented for unscaled surprises, 
indicate that the intercept is significantly negative. As expected the ERC is higher than is 
                                                 
18
Cheong and Thomas (2009) present evidence that indicates the absence of scale in earnings surprises and 
argues that the practice of scaling errors has taken hold in the literature with no compelling reason for it. 
They also show that scaling by price can lead to distortions in tests of hypotheses concerning the price 
response to earnings news.   
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typically achieved for when the full range of earnings surprises is included in the 
regression (Freeman and Tse 1992).  The last row present the Spearman and Pearson 
correlations between quarterly ERCs and intercepts and the coefficient from a regression 
of quarterly intercepts on quarterly ERCs. Consistent with hypothesis 2, there is reliably 
negative association.    
In rational expectations models of reporting bias, the marginal benefit of a positive 
surprise is increasing in the a priori level of a stock’s ERC. In contrast, it could be argued 
(as some of the studies cited in section 2 do) that the realization of a positive surprises 
leads to a higher ERCs.  To date, no empirical study has discriminated the direction of 
causality between the ERC and a surprise. However, either possibility suggests that there 
will be a monotonic relation between PPS and ERC and, by hypothesis 2, a monotonic 
relation (in the opposite direction) between PPS and the intercept.  Panel B presents 
intercepts and ERCs in pooled and yearly regressions by quintile ranks of PPS. There is 
evidence of monotonicity in PPS for both parameters and in opposite directions. 
One possibility raised by the findings reported in panel B is that when any variable 
hypothesized to be linked to asymmetric price reactions to bright line surprises is 
correlated with PPS, tests of the hypothesis that are based on differential ERCs can be 
confounded.  To assess the potential for correlated omitted variables, I augment Model 1 
by adding the variable PPS and an interaction term PPS*ES and label this Model 2. 
Results for unscaled ES in pooled and yearly regressions are presented in panel C of table 
5. The results indicate that the PPS indicator is negative and highly significant while the 
interaction PPS*ES is positive and highly significant in the pooled and yearly regressions. 
For the yearly regressions I find that the PPS coefficient is negative in every year, while 
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the coefficient on PPS*ES is positive in 11 of 13 years. The results for Model 2 strongly 
suggest that to the extent any variable used to partition data that is correlated with PPS 
will likely contribute to a finding of asymmetric price reactions to bright line surprises 
(see also section 5.1, footnote 23).  
 
4.3. Robustness tests   
4.3.1. Hindsight biases in surprises 
The empirical tests conducted thus far rely on actual EPS and consensus analyst 
forecast data obtained from IBES. According to Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), Abarbanell 
and Lehavy (2007), IBES reports “street” earnings excluding one-time items (e.g., special 
items) and, therefore, the size and sign of surprises measured with IBES data can differ 
from the size and sign perceived by investors. In addition, Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) 
report that IBES often chooses the components to include in reported EPS after observing 
the market reaction to the earnings announcement. As discussed in the next section, even 
if systematic biases and/or hindsight biases are introduced into IBES surprises by a data 
provider’s administrative procedures, the hypotheses and results in the paper would still 
be relevant, however, it would be difficult to attribute the results thus far to the empirical 
validity of theories that posit a strategic incentive for managers to produce biased 
surprises.   
To ameliorate the effects of possible hindsight biases that contaminate tests of price 
reactions to earnings surprises, I employ a proprietary dataset from Briefing.com that 
should be free from this potential problem. Briefing.com provides real-time coverage of 
firm news since 1992. In particular, the “in play” service reports EPS relative to the 
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outstanding First Call forecast consensus on the date of the earnings announcement. The 
following excerpt from Briefing.com provides an example. 
 
7:34AM CMS Energy beats by $0.06, reports revs in-line (CMS) 10.63 : Reports Q4 
(Dec) earnings of $0.30 per share, excluding non-recurring items, $0.06 better than the 
First Call consensus of $0.24; revenues rose 10.2% year/year to $1.84 bln vs the $1.84 
bln consensus.
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I collect all available quarterly earnings announcement data from Briefing.com 
using a text searching program, PERL, and construct a dataset of observations common 
to IBES and Briefing.com with respect to the earnings announcement date. I then rerun 
all of the key tests of this section. The total number of observations for this dataset is 
25,886, considerably smaller than the original sample because Brieifing.com only began 
extensive coverage of earnings announcements after 1997 and because I delete 
observations for which the two data services do not report the same earnings 
announcement date. Untabulated descriptive statistics indicate that, compared to the 
sample used in this study, firms in this common dataset report larger EPS (mean of 41 
cents versus 25 cents), total assets (mean of 8,207 million versus 3,127 million), earnings 
surprises (2 cents versus -1 cents), and size-adjusted returns  (mean 0.38% versus 0.18%). 
However, the industry composition is very similar using the Fama-French 30 industry 
classification.  
I find that the Briefing.com sample produces results qualitatively similar to those 
reported for the sample in tables 2-5 (untabulated for the sake of brevity).  Specifically, I 
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http://www.briefing.com 
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find that the ratio of positive-to-negative surprises is increasing in PPS, zero surprises 
produce negative stock reactions, on average, which are increasing in PPS quintile, and 
the surprise necessary to produce a neutral stock reaction is significantly positive and 
increasing in PPS quintile. I also find that the PPS is increasing in ERC and that ERCs 
and intercepts in regressions of CAR on ES are negatively correlated. 
 
4.3.2. Changing the cutoff used to define PPS     
The logit model estimation of PPS described in the appendix is based on the 
specification in Barton and Simko (2002), which estimates the probability that a surprise 
will be greater than or equal to zero.
20
 Table 6 presents the PTN and CARs for zero 
surprises by quintile of PPS for alternative cutoffs used to estimate PPS.  The alternative 
cutoffs range from -3, -2 -1, 0, +1, +2 and +3 cents. The results are qualitatively similar 
for each alternative cutoff. In untabulated results I also find that intercepts are decreasing 
and ERCs are increasing in PPS for all alternative specifications using these cutoffs. In 
the next section I elaborate on these results and their implications for studies that 
hypothesize that firms engage in deliberate efforts to manage earnings or analysts’ 
forecasts in an effort to meet or beat expectations. 
   
5. Interpreting prior literature using a rational framework  
5.1. Evidence of the existence of a “Torpedo” effect  
Some studies hypothesize asymmetric price responses to bright line earnings 
surprises for reasons that would have no direct implications for the actual empirical 
distributions of earnings surprises. In other words, these theories do not predict a 
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Matsumoto (2002), Rees (2005), and Cheng (2006) have also developed similar logit models 
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propensity for positive earnings surprises in distributions of earnings surprises like that 
observed in figure 1, but nevertheless employ such distributions in their empirical tests. 
Moreover, inferences from empirical tests of these hypotheses often implicitly rely on the 
neutral reaction assumption and/or are affected by the practice of partitioning data on ex 
post realizations of surprises.  
Some of the hypotheses that predict asymmetric price responses to surprises that 
meet or fail to meet “bright lines,” link the prediction to either market mispricing or a 
correction of prior mispricing. For example, following on Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishney (1994), Skinner and Sloan (2002) hypothesize that investors fixate on firms’ past 
growth and maintain unreasonably high growth expectations for firms with high past 
growth rates, i.e., firms with high market-to-book ratios or high price-to-earnings ratios. 
They argue this irrationality is corrected around earnings announcements when there is a 
negative earnings surprise. This in turn, results in larger negative stock price reactions to 
small negative surprises for high MB and PE firms. Skinner and Sloan compare 
announcement CARs of high and low MB (PE) firms for small positive and negative ex 
post surprises and find that the difference in CARs for the latter are significantly larger in 
absolute magnitude than that for the former. They deem this response the “Torpedo” 
effect.
 21
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Other theories posit rational but non-linear responses to small negative versus positive earnings surprises 
as a function of the “state” of the economy or asymmetric price responses to positive and negative earnings 
surprises as a function of investor sentiment. These theories also have no implications for the shape of 
empirical distributions of ES but are tested using these data.  For example, Conrad, Cornell and Landsman 
(2002) test the predictions of Veronesi (1999) and find ERCs associated with negative surprises increase 
relative to those for positive surprise as the level of the market rises. They measure the level of the market 
using a rolling window changes in cross-sectional PE. However, similar to the case of Skinner and Sloan 
(2002), they do not control for the propensity for positive surprises, which was shown earlier to be strongly 
positively correlated with PE.  
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Panel A of table 7 presents mean PPS, PTN and CAR at zero earnings surprises for 
MB and PE and quintiles.  All three variables are increasing in MB and PE, a result that 
still holds when MB is not included in the estimation of PPS (see appendix 2).  That is, 
there is reason to suspect that PE and MB are also proxies for the ex ante probability of a 
positive surprise.  Similar to the results for PPS, differences in PTN and CAR for zero 
surprises between the high and low quintiles are significant for both MB and PE.  
Panel B of table 7 reports the three-day size-adjusted stock return for earnings 
surprises ranging from -3 to +3 cents for all observations and by MB and PE quintile. As 
predicted by the positive correlation between MB (PE) and PPS, the difference in mean 
CARs between the highest and the lowest MB (PE) quintiles for surprises of -2 and -1 
cent (-1 cent) are significantly larger in magnitude than mean CARs for surprises of +2 
and +1 cents (+1 cent), respectively.
22
 That is, ignoring the negative CAR to zero 
surprises (i.e., accepting the empirical validity of the neutral reaction assumption) 
predicted in hypothesis 1a and empirical results on different ZEROs by PPS reported in 
the previous section, then comparing returns to surprises of a similar magnitude on either 
side of zero leads to the conclusion that price responses are asymmetrically more 
negative for high MB (PE) firms for the negative earnings surprise. However, in 
untabulated results when I estimate (out of sample) the value of a surprise that generates 
a neutral response using the methods of interpolation and regression by MB quintile, I 
find that the absolute value of the difference in CARs between high MB and low MB 
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Note Skinner and Sloan (2002) use a longer window abnormal return in order to capture the stock price 
reaction to pre-announced earnings announcements as Skinner (1994) and Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther 
(2000) argue. Because the stock price reactions to longer window are likely to impound information other 
than earnings news, I use three-day earnings return as the primary measure of market reaction to earnings 
surprises.  However, even when I use a set of observations from Briefing.com that are likely to be free of 
pre-announcement problem, a similar result is obtained.     
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firms around surprises in the neighborhood of 1 cent above and 1 cent below the 
interpolated value are not significantly different.  A similar absence of significance is 
observed when PE is used to sort the observations. Thus, after controlling for the 
propensity for positive surprises in the ES distribution I find no support for the presence 
of a torpedo effect based on CAR tests in my sample.
23
  
The remaining columns of panel B report evidence of near monotonicity in CARs 
but different ZERO points as a function of MB and PE rank. The evidence mirrors the 
results reported in panel A of table 4 for level of PPS.  
 
5.2. Purported penalties to surprises that take on specific values   
The usefulness of the rational expectations framework and its implications for tests 
of the information content of bright line surprises using comparisons of ERCs is perhaps 
best illustrated in the context of studies that claim to show that earnings surprises that 
take on specific values create asymmetric or discontinuous price responses.  A recent 
example is Keung, Lin and Shih (2009) (KLS). The authors posit that investors have 
learned over time about managers’ increasing tendency to bias earnings surprises through 
earnings or forecast manipulation. Relying on the learning hypothesis, they predict that 
earnings surprises in the interval [0, 1] cent will be increasingly “penalized” by the 
market over time. In essence, KLS draw a bright line on both sides of the earnings 
surprise. They compare ERCs for earnings surprises in the interval [0, 1] cent to ERCs 
for surprises in adjacent intervals also defined by a 1 cent range (i.e., the intervals [-1, 0) 
and (1, 2], etc) and find evidence that ERCs associated with surprises in the interval [0, 1] 
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In untabulated results I find that ERCs are strongly increasing while intercepts are strongly decreasing in 
MB and PE for both scaled and unscaled ES, consistent with hypothesis 2 under the assumption that MB 
and PE proxy for the probability of a positive surprise.   
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are lower than surprises for both adjacent bins in the last of the three 5-year sub periods 
they examine but not in the first two. Based on these results, the authors conclude that the 
market has recently come to view an earnings surprise of exactly 0 or 1 cent as a red flag. 
KLS base their prediction on a rational market, albeit one that is slow to learn. If 
this is so, then the predictions in H1a and H2 should both apply. KLS report abnormal 
returns to zero surprises are negative in each of the three sub periods they examine (see 
table 1 of KLS), consistent with the evidence presented in table 3 discussed in the 
previous section. In addition, they report abnormal returns to zero and one cent surprises 
become increasingly more negative in the last two sub periods. Although at first blush 
this results seems to be consistent with KLS’s learning hypothesis, a closer examination 
of abnormal return patterns in adjacent surprises reveals that increasingly more negative 
abnormal returns for the last two sub periods are observed for most of earnings surprises 
ranging from less than -4 cents to 2 cents, which is inconsistent with KLS’s hypothesis 
that zero and one cent are especially penalized by investors. Furthermore, they show that 
abnormal announcement returns are monotonically increasing in the sign and size of 
earnings surprises in every sub period, which is consistent with the results reported in 
panel A of table 4.  That is to say, KLS find no evidence that the CARs for surprises in 
interval [0, 1] interrupt the usual pattern of monotonicity in bins that contain increasingly 
larger ex post surprises. Of course, it is possible for CARs to follow a monotonic pattern 
in ex post surprises while the ERCs associated with surprises in the interval [0, 1] are 
lower than those associated with adjacent bins.  
I test the possibility of lower ERCs for surprises in the [0, 1] by running separate 
regressions of CAR on ES (scaled by price) for each level of surprises in the range of -2 
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to +2 cents for the last two 5-year sub periods examined by KLS. The key difference 
between my regression and KLS’s is that I allow intercepts to vary by bin while they do 
not. In addition, I do not aggregate zero surprises with one cent surprises because there is 
no variation in the independent variable for zero surprises. Scaling by price is required 
because of the absence of variation in the independent variable in unscaled surprises.  
The results of these regressions are shown in panel A of table 8. Unlike the results 
in KLS, slope coefficients (i.e., ERCs) are never significant for any level of surprise in 
either sub period once the intercepts are included. However, the y-intercept generally 
decreases for the second sub periods for most intervals. This is consistent with the 
presence of greater reporting bias in the second sub-period throughout a wide range of 
earning surprises, which was also indicated by the results in panel B of table 2 and table 3. 
That is, while not monotonically increasing over time larger negative reactions to small 
surprises were observed on average in these years. Thus, inconsistent with KLS’s 
hypothesis, the market seems to penalize all small earnings surprises, not just surprises of 
zero or one cent. Furthermore, the penalty to these surprises appears through the average 
abnormal return, not through the ERC.
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Panel B of table 8 presents regressions similar to those presented in panel A but 
include the level of PPS as well as an interaction term between PPS and ES to test 
hypothesis 2. These regressions tests a joint hypothesis implied by the rational 
expectations framework. If investors penalize +1 cent earnings surprises by assigning 
lower ERCs because they are more likely to be biased than other surprises, and if the 
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When I aggregate zero surprises with one cent surprises results indicate that the incremental response 
coefficient for the last period is not significantly different from the second period. However, consistent with 
the results shown in panel A of table 8, the y-intercept becomes increasingly more negative in the last 
period. 
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investors assess each firm’s possibility of the bias, then the PPS coefficient should be 
positive while the PPS*ES coefficient should be negative in the second sub-period for +1 
cent surprises. On the other hand, if investors penalize +1 cent earnings surprises by 
assigning low average returns instead of low ERCs, then the PPS coefficient should be 
negative while the PPS*ES coefficient should be positive in the second sub-period for +1 
cent surprises. I find no evidence of an unusual penalty to +1 cent surprises in ERCs as 
the interaction terms for all intervals are insignificant. Furthermore, the PPS coefficient 
takes on mostly negative values for all intervals. These results indicate the penalty is 
applied to high PPS firms in all surprise bins, however the penalty is applied through the 
average stock return, in contrast to KLS’s hypothesis. I conclude that the absence of 
significantly positive ERC interactions for most small surprises even in the presence of 
significantly negative intercepts is attributable to the lack of meaningful variation in the 
independent variables.  
The evidence presented in table 8 suggests that tests for asymmetric price reactions 
that compare the incremental slopes of adjacent bins without also controlling for the 
propensity for a positive surprise and including incremental intercepts to capture the 
effect predicted by hypothesis 1a or 2 will have low power and can result in incorrect 
inferences. The argument is analogous to the discussion of potentially confounded 
inferences when abnormal returns on either side of a bright line are compared but 
generalized bias is present in all surprises.    
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5.3. The “Meet or Beat” literature 
The notion that firms bias earnings or manage forecasts with the intent to “meet or 
beat” analysts’ expectations (MBE) has gained greater credence with the growing number 
of academic studies that presume or attempt to test the empirical validity of the claim 
(Lopez and Rees 2002, Matsumoto 2002, Bartov et al. 2002, Kasznik and McNichols 
2002, McVay, Nagar and Tang 2006, and Koh et al.2008). General acceptance of the 
claim has been furthered by repeated anecdotes in the popular press and highly publicized 
statements by policy makers concerned with what they term the “numbers game” (Levitt 
1998). The increased attention to the MBE argument has, in turn, spawned a stream of 
work that seeks to develop models that predict the ex ante probability that a firm will 
report earnings with the specific intent of beating analysts’ expectations. Barton and 
Simko (2002), Matsumoto (2002), Rees (2005) and Cheng (2006), for example, all 
employ variations of the logit model describe in the appendix to estimate the ex ante 
probability that a firm meets or beats expectations (PMBE).  
However, the results in table 3 demonstrate zero earnings surprises generate, on 
average, negative stock responses while small positive surprises generally produce 
neutral or positive surprises. This evidence suggests the empirical definition of MBE, 
which contemplates homogeneity of the market response to “on-cutoff” (i.e., zero 
surprises) and “above-cutoff” (i.e., positive surprises) fails to account for the fact that the 
former observations produce stock price reactions that are fundamentally different from 
the latter. In addition, Barton and Simko (2002) show that the variables used to estimate 
the MBE point in logit models perform similarly when the cutoff point selected for the 
prediction model is changed in either directions of zero. A natural question to follow this 
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evidence is whether the stock price reactions to earnings surprises are also similar when 
the probability of MBE is estimated using different cutoffs. The earlier findings presented 
in table 6 speak directly to this question.  There I show that the ability of PPS to predict 
PTN and CAR for zero surprises when assumed cutoff points range from -3 to -1 cents in 
the identification of the logit model (i.e., cut off values that clearly fail the MBE criterion) 
is similar to that for an assumed cutoff of 0. Furthermore, when the cutoff point for 
beating expectations in the estimation of PMBE is an arbitrarily defined value in a narrow 
range around zero and the ratios of surprises that beat that arbitrary cutoff relative to 
those that miss it are calculated, the model performs similarly for all values of the 
arbitrary cutoff (results untabulated).  
The preceding results suggest that models designed to predict the probability of 
meeting or beating the analysts’ forecast that is deemed theoretically interesting perform 
equally well when the cutoff point changes. This implies a possibility that there is no 
special meaning to meeting/beating vs. missing the analysts’ forecast. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In this study I analyze the implications of a market that rationally anticipates the 
propensity for positive earnings surprises for testing hypotheses that predict asymmetric 
price reactions to surprises that meet or fail to meet certain thresholds. Consistent with 
extant theory, I find support for the predictions that abnormal returns to zero earnings 
surprises are negative and decreasing in the level of PPS and the surprise necessary to 
generate a neutral stock response for high quintile PPS firms is, on average, positive 
(empirical estimates range between 1 and 2 cents). Also consistent with prior theory, I 
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find that ERCs and intercepts in regressions of abnormal announcement returns on 
earnings surprises are negatively associated.  Moreover, firms with a greater ex ante 
propensity to generate positive surprises are linked to larger ERCs and more negative 
intercepts in these regressions. This suggests the likelihood of correlated omitted variable 
problems when variables that are hypothesized to be associated with asymmetric or 
discontinuous price reactions to bright line surprises are also correlated with the ex ante 
probability that a firm will generate a positive surprise (e.g., PE or MB).  
It is important to reemphasize that my results do not refute the validity of 
hypotheses that involve deliberate actions by managers to generate positive surprises 
thorough earnings management or forecast management. Rather, they highlight the fact 
that if such hypotheses are empirically valid, then tests of market responses to earnings 
surprises that meet or fail to meet certain benchmarks can be improved if they account for 
the possibility that the market rationally anticipates these surprises in both the hypothesis 
development stage and in constructing the empirical design. In the absence of such 
refinements, empirical tests that implicitly adopt the neutral reaction hypothesis and/or 
partition surprises on their ex post realizations are likely to mechanically produce results 
that support the hypothesis of an asymmetric price reaction (alternatively, support a 
premise used in developing the original hypothesis rather than a prediction that follows 
from it).  
My analysis of earnings surprises also has implications for tests of hypotheses that 
predict irrational or rational, but non-linear, responses to earnings surprises that meet or 
fail to meet bright lines. Such hypotheses do not identify a role for strategic behavior in 
producing documented asymmetries in various surprise distributions. While the exact 
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answer to the cause of asymmetries in earnings surprise distributions remains something 
of a mystery, they are, nevertheless, an empirical fact. Therefore, to the extent that 
market pricing anticipates them, there is a violation of the assumption of a neutral 
reaction to zero surprises and thus inferences drawn from standard CAR and ERC tests 
will be confounded. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the main variables. Panel B presents the Spearman correlations of 
these variables below the diagonal and the Pearson correlations above the diagonal. ES is defined as IBES 
actual EPS minus the IBES consensus analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast is the 
median value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings 
announcement. PPS measures the probability of a positive earnings surprise. PPS is estimated using 12-
quarter rolling window logit regressions (see appendix for estimation procedure). PE is the price per share 
divided by the sum of four quarters EPS excluding extraordinary items as of the last quarter. MB is the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the last quarter. CAR is calculated with 
buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. ** (*) indicates 
significance at 1% (5%) level, respectively.     
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 
 
  
Mean Std Skew Max 95% 75% Med 25% 5% Min
ES -0.01 0.13 -2.12 0.39 0.14 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.20 -0.70
PPS 0.70 0.16 -0.93 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.74 0.61 0.38 0.00
PE 29.77 44.70 5.09 343.75 85.00 27.41 17.86 12.88 7.60 4.60
MB 3.27 3.55 3.60 24.45 9.32 3.61 2.18 1.44 0.79 0.44
CAR 0.18% 8.11% 2.40% 26.36% 13.88% 3.92% 0.10% -3.55% -13.37% -25.63%
ES PPS PE MB CAR
ES 0.26** -0.02** 0.05** 0.19**
PPS 0.28** 0.03** 0.22** 0.04**
PE -0.02** 0.15** 0.18** -0.00    
MB 0.07** 0.35** 0.41** -0.01    
CAR 0.28** 0.04** 0.00    -0.00    
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Table 2: Positive-to-Negative earnings surprise ratios by PPS quintiles 
 
Panel A reports the ratio of positive-to-negative earnings surprises, PTN, by the quintile ranks of PPS. 
Panel B reports the number of observations and the mean value of PPS for a small range of ES by the 
quintile rank of PPS. Panel C reports the regression results of PTN on PPS by quarter. Positive surprises 
are defined as surprises greater than or equal to 0.005, and negative surprises are defined as surprises less 
than or equal to -0.005. The ratio is calculated using non-zero surprises of an absolute magnitude of 2, 5, 
and 10 cents.  ES is defined as IBES actual EPS minus the IBES consensus analysts’ forecast where the 
consensus analysts’ forecast is the median value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one 
month prior to the earnings announcement. PPS is the probability of a positive earnings surprise. It is 
estimated using 12-quarter rolling window logit regression (see appendix for estimation procedure). The 
statistical significance of PTN relative to 1 is evaluated with a χ2-test, and the statistical significance of the 
difference between the PTNs for the highest PPS quintile and for the lowest PPS quintile is evaluated with 
a z-test. ** (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. PTN by the quintile ranks of PPS 
 
 
Panel B. Number of observations and mean PPS at small range of ES by the quintile rank of PPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All obs PPS rank=1 PPS rank=2 PPS rank=3 PPS rank=4 PPS rank=5 PPS rank=(5-1)
PTN (2 cents) 2.25** 1.07*  1.58** 2.14** 3.22** 5.09** 4.01**
PTN (5 cents) 2.27** 0.99    1.55** 2.26** 3.45** 5.91** 4.92**
PTN (10 cents) 2.17** 0.89** 1.48** 2.24** 3.53** 6.10** 5.21**
PPS rank -2 cent -1 cent 0 cent 1 cent 2 cent
1 1,021 1,300 1,916 1,455 1,037
2 854 1,279 2,387 1,928 1,435
3 680 1,187 2,682 2,294 1,707
4 459 969 2,763 2,731 1,868
5 321 715 2,634 3,040 2,223
All 3,335 5,450 12,382 11,448 8,270
PPS rank -2 cent -1 cent 0 cent 1 cent 2 cent
1 44.4% 44.6% 45.0% 45.2% 45.2%
2 63.6% 63.6% 63.9% 63.9% 63.8%
3 73.7% 73.7% 73.9% 74.1% 74.0%
4 80.7% 80.9% 80.9% 81.0% 81.0%
5 87.5% 87.5% 88.0% 88.2% 88.3%
All 64.4% 67.5% 72.1% 74.1% 74.0%
Number of observations by ES
Mean PPS by ES
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(Table 2 continued) 
 
Panel C. The relation between PTN and PPS 
 
  
Model Intercept PPS Time N Adj R
2
Predicted (?) (+) (?)
Model 1: PTN = β 0  + β 2  PPS -1.04*  3.81** 52 40.39%
(2.33) 5.96
Model 2: PTN = β 0  + β 1 Time + β 2  PPS -1.86** 5.40** -0.04** 52 65.84%
(5.14) 9.86 (6.18)
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Table 3: Abnormal return around earnings announcement for zero earnings 
surprise 
 
Panel A reports the mean and the median values of the probability of a positive surprise, PPS, and the 3-
day size-adjusted return around earnings announcement (CAR) at zero surprise by year. Panel B reports the 
mean and the median values of PPS and CAR at zero surprise by the quintile ranks of PPS. PPS measures 
the probability of a positive earnings surprise (see appendix for estimation procedure). CAR is calculated 
with buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. The 
statistical significance of the mean values and the differences in the mean values with respect to 50% for 
PPS and 0 for CAR are evaluated with a t-test. The statistical significance of the median values and 
differences in the median values are evaluated with a sign test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, 
respectively. ** (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Mean and median values of PPS and CAR for zero earnings surprises by year 
 
 
Panel B. Mean and median values of PPS and CAR for zero earnings surprises by PPS quintiles 
 
Fiscal year N PPS CAR PPS CAR
1996 600 64.9%** -0.15%    69.5%** -0.20%    
1997 708 67.7%** -0.04%    72.2%** -0.16%    
1998 801 66.7%** -0.53%    70.6%** -0.59%**
1999 668 70.5%** -0.89%** 74.0%** -1.25%**
2000 691 70.9%** -0.78%*  74.3%** -0.41%    
2001 1,034 69.2%** -1.06%** 72.6%** -0.80%**
2002 1,182 74.1%** -1.47%** 77.2%** -0.71%**
2003 1,179 76.8%** -1.28%** 80.0%** -0.89%**
2004 1,107 78.3%** -1.43%** 81.4%** -0.78%**
2005 908 76.9%** -1.52%** 80.0%** -1.07%**
2006 835 74.4%** -1.62%** 78.0%** -1.49%**
2007 876 70.9%** -1.36%** 73.8%** -1.09%**
2008 612 67.5%** -0.84%*  70.1%** -0.55%    
All obs 11,201 72.1%** -1.07%** 75.6%** -0.75%**
Mean Median
PPS rank PPS CAR PPS CAR PPS CAR PPS CAR
1 43.7%** 0.30%    46.2%** -0.13%    46.0%** -0.13%    45.0%** 0.07%    
2 64.0%** -0.43%    63.7%** -0.87%** 64.0%** -1.37%** 63.9%** -0.89%**
3 73.7%** -0.53%*  74.0%** -1.01%** 73.9%** -1.14%** 73.9%** -0.89%**
4 80.7%** -0.95%** 81.0%** -1.71%** 81.0%** -1.65%** 80.9%** -1.47%**
5 87.6%** -1.18%** 88.1%** -1.99%** 88.0%** -2.10%** 88.0%** -1.87%**
(5-1) 43.9%** -1.48%** 41.9%** -1.86%** 42.0%** -1.97%** 43.0%** -1.94%**
PPS rank PPS CAR PPS CAR PPS CAR PPS CAR
1 45.7%** -0.24%    48.3%** -0.25%    48.3%** -0.25%    47.2%** -0.25%    
2 64.4%** -0.32%    63.9%** -0.53%*  64.5%** -0.93%** 64.2%** -0.60%**
3 73.8%** -0.41%*  74.1%** -0.43%    73.8%** -0.91%** 73.9%** -0.52%**
4 80.6%** -0.60%** 80.9%** -1.09%** 81.1%** -1.33%** 80.9%** -0.98%**
5 86.9%** -0.56%    87.8%** -1.18%** 87.5%** -1.87%** 87.5%** -1.22%**
(5-1) 41.2%*  -0.31%*  39.5%** -0.93%** 39.2%** -1.62%** 40.3%** -0.97%**
1996-1999 2000-2004 2005-2008
1996-1999 2000-2004 2005-2008
All periods
Mean
Median
All periods
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Table 4: Finding ZERO 
 
Panel A reports the mean size-adjusted returns (CAR) to small earnings surprises by the quintile ranks of 
PPS. Panel B reports the level of earnings surprise that corresponds to a neutral stock price reaction, ZERO, 
by year. Panel C reports the value of ZERO by the quintile ranks of PPS. ZERO is estimated using two 
methods: interpolation and regression. The interpolation method entails connecting the two adjacent 
earnings surprises, mean size-adjusted, one of which is associated with a positive value of mean size-
adjusted return and the other of which is associated with a negative value of mean size-adjusted return. 
Denoting the earnings surprise axis as the x-axis and the stock return axis as y-axis, the point where the 
interpolated line crosses x-axis is deemed the value of ZERO. The regression method calculates ZERO by 
estimating the x-intercept from a linear regression of return on unscaled earnings surprise of less than or 
equal to two cents in magnitude. In panel C, the sample period (1996-2008) is divided into three sub-
periods: 1996-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2008. The statistical significance of ZERO is assessed through a 
bootstrapping technique. The bootstrapping methodology proceeds by first randomly selecting (with 
replacement) the same number of observations contained in the original sample and calculating ZERO. The 
process is repeated one thousand times to obtain the distribution of ZERO. Confidence intervals can be 
obtained from the ZERO distribution. CAR is calculated with buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return 
during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. PPS is the probability of meeting or beating the 
consensus analysts’ forecast calculated from the logit regression. ** (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) 
level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Mean CAR at small earnings surprises 
 
 
 
 
 
ES All obs 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1)
-10 -4.14%** -3.66%** -2.53%** -5.56%** -6.41%** -6.19%** -2.53%    
-9 -3.81%** -1.69%** -5.01%** -6.20%** -5.74%** -3.85%** -2.16%    
-8 -3.52%** -2.44%** -3.97%** -3.88%** -6.40%** -1.85%    0.59%    
-7 -3.71%** -2.98%** -2.74%** -5.12%** -5.88%** -4.05%** -1.08%    
-6 -3.13%** -2.72%** -2.65%** -3.76%** -4.68%** -3.46%** -0.74%    
-5 -3.10%** -2.22%** -3.02%** -3.08%** -4.24%** -5.60%** -3.38%**
-4 -3.28%** -2.57%** -2.99%** -3.31%** -3.87%** -5.69%** -3.12%**
-3 -3.27%** -2.12%** -3.21%** -3.78%** -4.60%** -4.47%** -2.35%**
-2 -2.40%** -1.57%** -1.36%** -3.04%** -3.52%** -4.85%** -3.28%**
-1 -2.01%** -0.70%** -1.68%** -2.10%** -3.26%** -3.22%** -2.52%**
0 -1.07%** 0.07%    -0.89%** -0.89%** -1.47%** -1.87%** -1.94%**
1 0.32%** 1.35%** 0.66%** 0.32%    0.14%    -0.25%    -1.60%**
2 1.60%** 2.19%** 1.91%** 1.56%** 1.59%** 1.16%** -1.02%**
3 2.19%** 1.99%** 2.38%** 2.32%** 2.10%** 2.15%** 0.16%    
4 2.81%** 2.92%** 3.04%** 2.67%** 2.62%** 2.88%** -0.04%    
5 3.24%** 3.04%** 3.99%** 2.87%** 3.18%** 3.17%** 0.14%    
6 3.06%** 3.09%** 3.42%** 3.10%** 3.19%** 2.68%** -0.42%    
7 3.61%** 3.09%** 3.87%** 3.90%** 3.99%** 3.06%** -0.03%    
8 3.33%** 3.46%** 3.82%** 3.34%** 2.47%** 3.75%** 0.29%    
9 3.44%** 3.09%** 3.62%** 3.60%** 3.54%** 3.24%** 0.15%    
10 3.90%** 6.81%** 3.26%** 3.53%** 3.20%** 3.77%** -3.05%    
PPS quintile ranks
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(Table 4 continued) 
 
Panel B. ZERO by year 
 
 
Panel C. ZERO by PPS 
 
Fiscal year Interpolation Regression N Adj R
2
1996 0.15    0.07    7,025 1.70%
1997 0.17    -0.06    8,434 1.66%
1998 0.20    0.04    8,490 1.10%
1999 0.36** 0.26*  7,558 1.36%
2000 0.28    0.07    5,485 0.86%
2001 0.73** 0.63** 5,912 1.20%
2002 0.66** 0.78** 6,231 1.50%
2003 0.74** 0.64** 6,356 2.36%
2004 0.72** 0.77** 6,378 2.54%
2005 0.86** 0.94** 5,930 3.19%
2006 1.10** 1.06** 5,507 2.89%
2007 0.68** 0.66** 5,432 4.30%
2008 0.39    0.44** 3,893 2.94%
All 0.54** 0.49** 82,631 1.91%
Estimated through interpolation
Period 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1)
1996-1999 -0.44    0.34    0.34*  0.87** 1.48    1.92    
2000-2004 0.09    0.53** 0.86** 0.87** 1.01** 0.92*  
2005-2008 0.17    0.77** 1.13** 1.00** 1.14** 0.96*  
All -0.09    0.57** 0.74** 0.92** 1.18** 1.27**
Estimated through regression
Period 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1)
1996-1999 -0.58    -0.02    0.31*  0.66** 1.44*  2.02**
2000-2004 -0.10    0.32    0.78** 0.98** 1.17** 1.26**
2005-2008 -0.04    0.71** 1.05** 1.10** 1.19** 1.22**
All -0.26    0.42** 0.72** 0.95** 1.20** 1.46**
PPS quintiles
PPS quintiles
44 
 
Table 5: The relation between the y-intercept and slope in a regression of CAR on 
earnings surprise 
 
Panel A reports the relation between the y-intercept and ERC obtained from quarterly regression of Model 
1, which is regression of CAR on ES. Panel B reports the y-intercept and ERC by the quintile ranks of PPS 
from pooled and yearly regressions of Model 1. Panel C reports the y-intercept, ERC, incremental y-
intercept and incremental ERC by PPS from pooled, yearly, and quarterly regressions of Model 2. For the 
regressions in this table, ES observations are limited to a range of -2 to +2 cents. Results are presented for 
unscaled ES. Panel A reports the relation between the y-intercept and ERC through regression and 
correlation (S: Spearnman, P: Pearson). Panel B and C reports Fama-Macbeth coefficients and t-statistics 
with the average number of observations and the average adjusted R
2
 for each yearly regression. Neg/All 
(Pos/All) is the ratio of the number of negative (positive) coefficients to the number of all coefficients. CAR 
is defined as buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. ES 
is defined as actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast is 
the median value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings 
announcement. PPS is the probability of a positive earnings surprise, estimated using a 12-quarter rolling 
window logit regression (see appendix for estimation procedure). ** (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) 
level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Relation between Y-intercept and ERC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Intercept ES N Adj R
2
Predicted (-) (+)
Model 1 (Pooled regression): CAR = α0  + β 0 ES -0.0044** 0.90** 82,631 1.91%
(15.77) 40.08
Model 1 (Yearly regression): CAR = α0  + β 0 ES -0.0046** 0.89** 1,589 2.10%
(6.73) 23.69
Model 1 (Quarterly regression): CAR = α0  + β 0 ES -0.0047** 0.91** 6,356 2.12%
(4.68) 18.45
Model β 0 N Adj R
2 Corr (α 0 , β 0 )
Predicted (-)
Model 1' (Using coefficients from Model 1):  α0  = γ β 0 -0.01** 52 55.47% -0.40** S
(8.11) -0.45** P
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
Panel B. Y-intercept and ERC by the quintile ranks of PPS 
 
Model PPS rank Intercept ES N Adj R
2
Model 1 (Pooled regression): CAR = α0  + β 0 ES 1 0.0025*  0.96** 6,090 2.20%
2.40 11.75
2 -0.0041** 0.97** 7,140 2.17%
(4.22) 12.61
3 -0.0085** 1.18** 7,670 3.08%
(9.17) 15.63
4 -0.0139** 1.46** 7,920 3.85%
(13.89) 17.83
5 -0.0181** 1.50** 7,903 3.92%
(17.36) 17.99
(5-1) -0.0206** 0.54**
(14.00) 4.63
Model PPS rank Intercept ES N Adj R
2
Model 1 (Yearly regression): CAR = α0  + β 0 ES 1 0.0026    0.94** 468 2.10%
0.66 3.17
2 -0.0034    0.94** 549 2.17%
(0.96) 3.44
3 -0.0079*  1.17** 590 3.10%
(2.45) 4.37
4 -0.0128** 1.44** 609 3.83%
(3.70) 4.92
5 -0.0159** 1.28** 608 3.28%
(4.33) 4.51
(5-1) -0.0184** 0.34*  
(8.12) 1.99
Average values from the yearly regressions
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
Panel C. Incremental Y-intercept and ERC by PPS 
 
Model Intercept ES PPS PPS*ES N Adj R
2
Predicted (?) (?) (-) (+)
Model 2: (Pooled) CAR = α0  + β 0 ES + α 1  PPS + β 1 PPS*ES 0.0216** 0.42** -0.04** 1.12** 36,723 3.20%
10.55 2.59 (14.91) 4.94
Model 2: (Yearly) CAR = α0  + β 0 ES + α 1  PPS + β 1 PPS*ES 0.0200** 0.41*  -0.04** 1.02** 2,825 3.19%
6.46 2.08 (8.94) 3.60
(Neg/All) (13/13) (11/13) (Pos/All)
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Table 6: Robustness test 
 
The table presents the ratios of positive-to-negative earnings surprises, PTN, and the mean 3-day size-
adjusted return around earnings announcement, CAR, for zero surprises by the quintile ranks of PPS. 
Positive surprises are defined as surprises greater than or equal to 0.005, and negative surprises are defined 
as surprises less than or equal to -0.005. The ratio is calculated using non-zero surprises of an absolute 
magnitude of 2 cents.  PPS is the probability of a positive earnings surprise. It is estimated using 12-quarter 
rolling window logit regression (see appendix for estimation procedure). PPSm3, PPSm2, PPSm1 are the 
probabilities of an earnings surprise greater than or equal to -3 cents, -2 cents and -1 cent, respectively. 
PPSp3, PPSp2, and PPSp1 are the probabilities of an earnings surprise greater than or equal to 3 cents, 2 
cents and 1 cent, respectively. The statistical significance of PTN relative to 1 is evaluated with a χ2-test, 
and the statistical significance of the difference between the PTNs for the highest PPS quintile and for the 
lowest PPS quintile is evaluated with a z-test. CAR is calculated with buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock 
return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. ES is defined as actual EPS minus the consensus 
analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast is the median value of the most recent analysts’ 
forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings announcement. ** (*) indicates significance at 1% 
(5%) level, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
  
PPS ranks PTN CAR PTN CAR PTN CAR PTN CAR PTN CAR PTN CAR PTN CAR
1 0.93** 0.05%    0.91** 0.06%    0.90** 0.05%    0.89** 0.07%    0.92** -0.10%    1.00    -0.13%    1.10** -0.28%    
2 1.46** -0.80%** 1.46** -0.82%** 1.46** -0.81%** 1.48** -0.89%** 1.52** -0.81%** 1.64** -0.93%** 1.74** -1.14%**
3 2.22** -0.92%** 2.23** -0.92%** 2.26** -0.96%** 2.24** -0.89%** 2.31** -1.15%** 2.49** -1.39%** 2.62** -1.39%**
4 3.47** -1.51%** 3.50** -1.50%** 3.50** -1.44%** 3.53** -1.47%** 3.59** -1.31%** 3.42** -1.33%** 3.13** -1.22%**
5 5.88** -1.81%** 6.00** -1.81%** 6.05** -1.83%** 6.10** -1.87%** 5.24** -2.01%** 4.10** -1.72%** 3.48** -1.49%**
(5-1) 4.95** -1.85%** 5.08** -1.87%** 5.15** -1.89%** 5.21** -1.94%** 4.32** -1.91%** 3.10** -1.59%** 2.39** -1.21%**
PPSp3PPSPPSm3 PPSm2 PPSm1 PPSp1 PPSp2
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Table 7: The relation between the probability of a positive surprise and market-to-
book or price-to-earnings ratios 
 
Panel A reports the positive-to-negative earnings surprise ratios, PTN, and the mean values of the 
probability of a positive surprise, PPS, and the 3-day size-adjusted return around earnings announcement 
(CAR) at zero surprise by the quintile ranks of market-to-book (MB) or price-to-earnings (PE) ratio. Panel 
B reports the mean size-adjusted returns for small earnings surprises by the quintile ranks of MB and PE. 
The statistical significances of the mean values and the differences in the mean values with respect to 50% 
for PPS and 0 for CAR are evaluated with t-test. The statistical significance of the median values and the 
differences in median values are evaluated with sign tests and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, respectively. 
The statistical significance of PTN relative to 1 is evaluated with a χ2-test, and the statistical significance of 
the difference between the PTN for the highest PPS quintile and for the lowest PPS quintile is evaluated 
with a z-test. MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity as of the last quarter. PE 
is the price per share divided by the sum of four quarters EPS excluding extraordinary items as of the last 
quarter. PTN is calculated using non-zero surprises of an absolute magnitude of 2 cents. PPS measures the 
probability of a positive earnings surprise (see appendix for estimation procedure). CAR is calculated with 
buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. ES is defined as 
actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast is the median 
value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings announcement. ** 
(*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. PPS, PTN, and CAR at zero ES by the quintile ranks of MB or PE 
 
Ranks PPS PTN CAR PPS PTN CAR
1 63.0%** 1.52** 0.15%    66.6%** 1.70** -0.13%    
2 67.9%** 1.61** -0.22%*  70.7%** 1.78** -0.05%    
3 70.3%** 1.79** -0.22%*  73.2%** 1.89** -0.30%**
4 73.8%** 2.09** -0.74%** 75.1%** 2.21** -0.51%**
5 77.2%** 2.54** -1.18%** 75.2%** 2.29** -0.80%**
(5-1) 14.2%** 1.02** -1.33%** 8.6%** 0.60** -0.67%**
MB ranks PE ranks
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(Table 7 continued) 
 
Panel B. Mean CAR at small ES’s by the quintile ranks of MB and PE 
 
 
ES 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1) 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1)
-3 -1.50%** -1.87%** -2.08%** -2.88%** -2.96%** -1.46%** -1.73%** -1.99%** -2.24%** -2.28%** -2.70%** -0.97%**
-2 -1.31%** -1.20%** -1.45%** -1.81%** -3.03%** -1.73%** -1.21%** -1.10%** -1.71%** -1.75%** -1.94%** -0.73%*  
-1 -0.43%** -0.60%** -1.10%** -1.78%** -2.28%** -1.85%** -0.75%** -0.85%** -1.09%** -1.51%** -1.88%** -1.13%**
0 0.15%    -0.22%*  -0.22%*  -0.74%** -1.18%** -1.33%** -0.13%    -0.05%    -0.30%** -0.51%** -0.80%** -0.67%**
1 0.77%** 0.81%** 0.70%** 0.42%** 0.11%    -0.66%** 0.48%** 0.57%** 0.58%** 0.73%** 0.53%** 0.05%    
2 1.57%** 1.20%** 1.36%** 1.60%** 1.53%** -0.04%    1.11%** 1.14%** 1.46%** 1.83%** 2.01%** 0.90%**
3 2.14%** 1.85%** 2.04%** 2.11%** 2.25%** 0.11%    1.69%** 1.79%** 2.04%** 2.52%** 2.44%** 0.75%**
MB rank PE rank
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Table 8: Earnings response coefficients for given levels of surprise 
 
Panel A reports results from the regressions of CAR on scaled ES for unscaled earnings surprises of -2,-1, 
+1 and +2 cents, respectively. Panel B reports results from the regressions of CAR on scaled ES, PPS, and 
PPS*scaled ES for unscaled earnings surprises of -2,-1, +1 and +2 cents, respectively.  CAR is defined as 
buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock return during (-1, 1) days around earnings announcement. ES is defined as 
actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast is the median 
value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings announcement. 
Scaled ES is calculated by dividing unscaled ES by stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter. PPS 
measures the probability of a positive earnings surprise (see appendix for estimation procedure). ** (*) 
indicates significance at 1% (5%) level.   
 
Panel A. Regression of CAR on scaled ES for intervals defined in KLS 
 
 
 
 
 
Model: CAR = α  + βES/price 
Interval Year Intercept ES/price N R
2
ES=-2 cent 1997-2002 -0.0108** 0.88** 2,817 0.30%
(6.31) 3.06
2003-2007 -0.0212** 0.09    2,699 -0.03%
(13.71) 0.34
ES=-1 cent 1997-2002 -0.0092** 0.15    4,556 -0.02%
(6.85) 0.26
2003-2007 -0.0172** 0.91*  4,341 0.10%
(13.83) 2.28
ES=1 cent 1997-2002 0.0064** 0.17    10,006 -0.01%
6.98 0.33
2003-2007 0.0021*  0.40    8,212 0.00%
2.43 1.13
ES=2 cent 1997-2002 0.0163** -0.41    6,687 0.01%
14.15 (1.30)
2003-2007 0.0130** -0.42    6,183 0.02%
12.38 (1.59)
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(Table 8 continued) 
 
Panel B. Regression of CAR on scaled ES, PPS, and PPS*scaled ES for intervals defined in KLS 
 
 
  
Model: CAR = α 0  + α 1 PPS + β 0 ES/price + β 1 PPS*ES/price
Interval period Intercept PPS ES/price PPS*ES/price N R
2
ES=-2 cent 1997-2002 0.0027    -0.0172    2.38** 2.13    856 1.83%
0.25 (1.02) 3.64 0.66
2003-2007 0.0374** -0.0870** -1.31    4.39    1,341 2.92%
3.18 (5.17) (0.68) 1.25
ES=-1 cent 1997-2002 0.0186*  -0.0477** 5.00    -8.17    1,501 0.58%
2.01 (3.37) 1.64 (1.17)
2003-2007 0.0498** -0.0988** 7.23*  -7.04    2,252 2.31%
4.78 (7.13) 2.26 (1.66)
ES=1 cent 1997-2002 0.0250** -0.0282** 8.97*  -13.79    3,344 0.73%
3.18 (2.63) 2.41 (1.88)
2003-2007 0.0216** -0.0262** 2.37    -2.84    4,975 0.24%
2.88 (2.74) 0.96 (0.70)
ES=2 cent 1997-2002 0.0267** -0.0155    -0.37    2.26    2,219 0.05%
2.93 (1.25) (0.23) 0.75
2003-2007 0.0280** -0.0178    -1.32    2.20    3,728 -0.01%
3.03 (1.51) (0.61) 0.70
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Figure 1: The ratio of positive-to-negative earnings surprises over time 
 
The figure shows the ratio of positive-to-negative earnings surprises ratio (PTN) over time. PTN ratios are 
calculated for analysts’ forecast-based surprise, ES defined as IBES actual EPS minus the IBES consensus 
analysts’ forecast of EPS, where the consensus analysts’ forecast is the median value of the most recent 
analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings announcement. A surprise is deemed 
positive when it is greater than or equal to 0.005, and negative when it is less than or equal to -0.005. PTNs 
are calculated for samples restricting the absolute values of ES to be within 2 cents, 5 cents, and 10 cents.  
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Figure 2: Firm’s potential reporting choices  
 
The following figure shows the manager’s reporting choice after observing the true earnings. The manager 
can either disclose true earnings or true earnings plus a bias. For example when   is the realized true 
earnings, the firm manager can report either   or s  
 
 
True earnings  
 
Reported earnings 
 s
+ 
s  
 
s  
s2  s
+ 
… … 
… … 
  
 
  
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Figure 3: Graphical summary of Empirical Hypotheses 
 
The following figure summarizes the empirical hypotheses. R is the stock return around earnings 
announcement. ES is earnings surprise defined as actual earnings minus the analysts’ forecast. α is the y-
intercept and β is the earnings response coefficient of the return vs. earnings surprise regression. The 
subscript H and L stands for the High probability of positive earnings surprise and Low probability of 
positive earnings surprises, respectively. ZERO is the level of earnings surprise that corresponds to the 
neutral stock price reaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  αH < αL <0 
Hypothesis 1b:  0 < ZEROL < ZEROH 
Hypothesis 2:  if βH > βL then {Prob(ESH>0) > Prob(ESL>0)} and αH < αL   
αH 
ZEROH 
Slope: βH 
Slope: βL 
Earnings Surprise (ES)  
High ERC (βH) 
αL 
Low ERC (βL) 
ZEROL 
Stock return (R) 
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Figure 4: The ratio of positive-to-negative earnings surprises by PPS 
 
The figure reports the ratio of positive-to-negative earnings surprises, PTN, by the probability of a positive 
surprise, PPS, over time. PTN ratios are calculated for analysts’ forecast-based surprise, ES, defined as 
IBES actual EPS minus the IBES consensus analysts’ forecast of EPS, where the consensus analysts’ 
forecast is the median value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the 
earnings announcement. A surprise is deemed positive when it is greater than or equal to 0.005, and 
negative when it is less than or equal to -0.005. PTN measures are calculated by restricting the earnings 
surprise to be non-zero and of an absolute value within 10 cents. PPS is estimated using 12-quarter rolling 
window logit regressions (see appendix for estimation procedure).  PPS level is high when the PPS quintile 
rank is 5, PPS level is low when the PPS quintile rank is 1, and PPS level is middle otherwise. 
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Figure 5: Finding ZERO through interpolation   
 
The following figure summarizes the interpolation method in table 4. First, mean size-adjusted returns at 
small surprise levels are calculated (-3 to +3 cents). Second, two adjacent points are selected, one below the 
earnings surprise axis and the other above it. ZERO is the point at which the connecting line intersects the 
earnings surprise axis.  
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Appendix 1 
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
 
The equilibrium cutoff of earnings management cost for reporting biased surprises 
The value of the firm conditional on the earnings report is: 
 
0 0( ) [ | ]i i i i iV r s E r s             (A1)  
The manager will inflate earnings if: 
 
)(ˆ)(ˆ 2 iiiii rVscsrV       (A2) 
 
Invoking the first rational-expectation condition (i.e., the manager’s conjecture on 
the market pricing function should equal the actual market pricing function: )()(ˆ  VV  ), 
I substitute for )(ˆ V  in (1):  
 
spscsps iii  ˆˆ)(
2      (A3a) 
 
or          
s
ci

       (A3b) 
 
Next, invoking the second rational-expectation condition (i.e., investors’ conjecture 
that the manager reports ss ii  )( 0  if and only if ˆic  otherwise the manager 
reports )( 0  iis  should be identical to what manager actually does),   
 
s

 ˆ        (A4) 
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Comparative statics  
Define the stock price reaction conditional on disclosure ir  as 0)( VrVR i  , 
where 00 V . The probability of surprise management is 
ab
as
s
Fcprobp i



/
)()(

  where (.)F  is the CDF of ic . Therefore, 
spsR i    where the earnings multiple   is also the earnings response coefficient of 
return on surprise regression. Also let R  when 0is  then   is the y-intercept of a 
regression of returns on surprises. The following comparative statics apply: 
 
(i) 0
)(
1



absd
dp

.  
(ii) If 0is , then 0 spR    
(iii) If 0is , then 0 s
dp
d
sp
dp
d
dp
dR


, 
 and 0




 d
dp
ssp
d
d
d
dR
  
 


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

 0
d
dp
  
(iv) The earnings surprise necessary to generate 0R   is 00  spsi  
(v) 0
0
 s
dp
dsi  and 0
0

 d
dp
s
d
dsi    
 





 0
d
dp
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Appendix 2 
The Probability of a Positive Surprise 
 
I construct the probability of positive surprise, PPS, by running a logit regression 
presented below in a twelve-quarter rolling window, which is adapted from Barton and 
Simko (2002).
25
 The out-of-sample coefficients are then applied to in-sample values of 
input variables to obtain the PPS. 
 
Pr(ES≥0)/Pr(ES<0) = exp(β0 + β1 NOA + β2 SHARES + β3 BIG5 + β4 PB  
+ β5 LTGN_RISK + β6 ANALYSTS + β7 PREV_MB + β8 CV_FORECAST  
+ β9 DOWN_REV + β10 SALES_GRW + β11 ROE + β12 ∆ROE+ β13 MKT_CAP 
 
ES is defined as the actual EPS minus the median consensus analysts’ forecast 
issued within one month prior to the earnings announcement. ES sometimes entails more 
than two decimals. In these cases, I treat ES≥0 if ES>-0.005. Following Barton and 
Simko I use thirteen independent variables for the logit regression: net operating assets at 
the end of prior quarter (NOA), weighted average number of common shares outstanding 
during the current quarter (SHARES), an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a 
Big 5 auditor in current quarter (BIG5), market-to-book ratio as of  the end of last quarter 
(PB), an indicator variable coded one for high litigation risk industries such as 
pharmaceuticals/biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail (LTGN_RISK), number 
of analysts in the most recent consensus EPS forecast (ANALYSTS), an indicator 
variable coded one for a nonnegative ES in last quarter (PREV_MB), coefficient of 
variation in analysts’ most recent EPS forecast (CV_FORECAST), an indicator variable 
coded one if at least one of the firm analysts revised his forecast down during the current 
quarter (DOWN_REV), sales for last quarter divided by the sales for four quarters prior 
to last quarter (SALES_GRW), net income divided by shareholder’s equity at the end of 
                                                 
25
 I estimate the logit regression using twelve-quarter rolling window following the technique in Cheng 
(2006).  
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last quarter (ROE), the change in ROE from two quarters before to last quarter (ΔROE), 
and the natural logarithm of market value of common shares at the end of current quarter 
(MKT_CAP).
26
  
The definitions of some of these variables are slightly different from Barton and 
Simko because Barton and Simko use this model to examine how each factor affects the 
probability of meeting or beating the forecast, whereas I use this model to calculate PPS 
prior to the announcement. Therefore, I only use values that are available prior to the 
earnings announcement. For example, I use PB, SALE_GRW, ROE, and ΔROE as of last 
quarter as opposed to as of current quarter in Barton and Simko.   
The descriptive statistics of the input variables are presented in panel A of appendix 
table 1. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99%. The values are generally comparable 
to Barton and Simko in spite of the difference in the period (1993-1999 in Barton and 
Simko vs. 1993-2008 in my sample) and the definitions of some variables. Both the mean 
and the median values of NOA are slightly higher in my sample (3.22 vs. 2.66 for mean 
and 2.16 vs. 1.97 for median), and the mean value of SHARES is almost the double of 
Barton and Simko (122.48 vs.60.69). This is likely to be due to firm size and shares 
increasing rapidly in recent years. The mean value of BIG5 is slightly above 90% 
indicating that most of the firms have Big 5, now Big 4, auditors. Mean PB ratio is about 
3.5 indicating the market value of equity is about three and a half times greater than the 
book value.
27
 Firm-quarters with high litigation risk are approximately 40% of the whole 
sample, indicating firms are often exposed to high litigation risk. The mean value of 
                                                 
26
Barton and Simko hypothesize that NOA reflects the cumulative overstatement effect of prior earnings 
management on the balance sheet, larger SHARES make firms hard to manage EPS, greater PB, 
LTGN_RISK, ANALYSTS, and PREV_MB leads to a greater incentives to manage earnings. 
CV_FORECAST captures the imprecision of analysts’ forecast which is likely to be negatively related to 
incentives to meet or beat, SALES_GRW, ROE, ∆ROE all capture the firm performance which is known to 
be positively related to the forecast error. Barton and Simko also consider the effect of potential downward 
forecast guidance on the probability of meeting or beating by including DOWN_REV and MKT_CAP. 
Firms with greater MKT_CAP are likely to have less optimistic forecast and therefore greater probability of 
meeting or beating. Barton and Simko don’t predict any signs for DOWN_REV and BIG5. See Barton and 
Simko for detailed discussion of the rationale for including these variables in their logit model.  
27
 Firms with negative book values are deleted from the sample. 
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ANALYSTS is 8.06, slightly larger than 6.39 reported by Barton and Simko, which 
reflects an increase analyst following in recent years. PREV_MB is 0.70, which, in part 
reflects the evidence in figure 1 of imbalance of positive to negative surprises in the 
cross-section. The mean CV_FORECAST in my sample is smaller than that reported by 
Barton and Simko (0.04 vs. 0.20) because I restrict the forecast to be within 31 days prior 
the announcement to avoid stale forecasts. A slightly greater DOWN_REV is observed in 
my sample (0.34 vs. 0.23). The levels of the remaining variables are very similar to those 
reported in Barton and Simko.  
Panel B summarizes the results of the logit regression. Because of the twelve-
quarter rolling window estimation procedure, the first regression window is from the first 
quarter of 1993 to the fourth quarter of 1995. There are in total 52 windows, and 
therefore 52 separate regressions are run, each regression based on approximately 18,000 
observations. Panel B presents the mean values of coefficients from 52 regressions 
alongside with the mean p-values, and the number of positive coefficients. All 
coefficients display signs consistent with those found in Barton and Simko except for 
DOWN_REV and ΔROE, with comparable magnitudes well. This is likely to be due to a 
slight difference in the definitions of variables and the estimation period of my model. 
Pseudo R
2
 and mean concordance percentage value indicate the regression model is 
powerful for surprise prediction (however, see additional comments in section 5).
28
  
                                                 
28
Pseudo R
2
 in panel B can be interpreted as adjusted R
2
 in OLS regression. It is defined as 1-
exp{2[logL(M)-logL(0)/n] where logL(M) and logL(0) are the maximized log likelihood for the fitted 
model and the “null” model containing only intercept term, and n is the sample size. See Maddala (1983). 
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Appendix Table 1 
Probability of a positive earnings surprise measure 
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the input variables for logit regressions that calculate the 
probability of a positive earnings surprise. The logit regression is adopted from Barton and Simko (2002) 
and is estimated through 12 quarter rolling windows during 1993-2008. The coefficients from the following 
out-of-sample regression are then applied to the in-sample values of input variables to obtain the 
probability of a positive earnings surprise. 
 
Model I: Pr(ES≥0)/Pr(ES<0) = exp(β0 + β1 NOA + β2 SHARES + β3 BIG5 + β4 PB + β5 LTGN_RISK  
+ β6 ANALYSTS + β7 PREV_MB + β8 CV_FORECAST + β9 DOWN_REV + β10 SALES_GRW + β11 ROE  
+ β11 ∆ROE+ β12 MKT_CAP) 
 
ES is defined as actual EPS minus the consensus analysts’ forecast where the consensus analysts’ forecast 
is the median value of the most recent analysts’ forecasts issued within one month prior to the earnings 
announcement. PPS is the probability of a positive earnings surprise from Model I: PPS=Pr(ES≥0). Panel B 
presents the mean values of the coefficients, the mean p-values, and other key statistics of the logit 
regression. All input variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. ** (*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) 
level, respectively.   
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Std Skew Max 75% Med 25% Min
NOA 3.23 3.76 3.26 24.63 3.58 2.17 1.28 -1.25
SHARES 122.40 281.91 5.04 2061.00 91.56 39.60 20.54 5.05
BIG5 0.91 0.29 -2.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
PB 3.64 3.71 3.44 25.38 4.10 2.55 1.65 0.51
LTGN_RISK 0.39 0.49 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ANALYSTS 8.10 5.77 1.28 27.00 11.00 6.00 4.00 2.00
PREV_MB 0.70 0.46 -0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
CV_FORECAST 0.05 0.35 -0.75 1.50 0.11 0.04 0.00 -1.71
DOWN_REV 0.34 0.47 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SALES_GRW 0.21 0.46 3.04 2.85 0.27 0.11 0.00 -0.59
ROE 0.03 0.36 -3.34 0.79 0.17 0.10 0.01 -2.11
ΔROE -0.01 0.14 -2.32 0.57 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.89
MKT_CAP 6.81 1.66 0.43 11.35 7.84 6.66 5.64 3.48
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(Appendix Table 1 continued) 
 
Panel B. Summary of the logit regression 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Predicted sign
Mean 
coefficient
Mean                  
P-values
Fama-Macbeth    
P-value
Number of 
positive 
coefficients
Intercept (?) -1.219 0.00 0.00 (0/52)
NOA (-) -0.028 0.05 0.00 (1/52)
SHARES (-) -0.001 0.00 0.00 (0/52)
Big5 (?) 0.143 0.20 0.00 (48/52)
PB (+) 0.005 0.30 0.00 (36/52)
LTGN_RISK (+) 0.143 0.09 0.00 (52/52)
ANALYSTS (+) 0.029 0.04 0.00 (52/52)
PREV_MB (+) 0.876 0.00 0.00 (52/52)
CV_FORECAST (+) 0.007 0.21 0.62 (29/52)
DOWN_REV (+) -0.758 0.00 0.00 (0/52)
SALES_GRW (+) 0.441 0.00 0.00 (52/52)
ROE (+) 0.230 0.12 0.00 (48/52)
ΔROE (+) -0.012 0.65 0.33 (23/52)
MKT_CAP (+) 0.202 0.00 0.00 (52/52)
Pseudo R
2
15.2%
Mean Concordant percentage 70.6%
Mean Discordant percentage 29.0%
Mean Number of Observations 17,654
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